Good Reads

It has been a while since we have been active on the site. However, we have been reading quite a bit and will start posting in a short while. In the meanwhile, we have connected up Goodreads to our blog so that we can share what we are reading more easily. Too bad we cannot share the annual reports through Goodreads.

Sotheby

I got drawn towards Sotheby’s stock after watching a video where Jim Chanos claimed that he was short Sotheby (NYSE:BID) Jim interestingly alluded that it was a great way to bet on the economy as it catered to the 10% of the top 1% and that the stock hit $10 in every financial crisis. I decided to go through BID’s annual report to see what I could find.

Sotheby’s business can be divided into three segments: Agency, Principal and Financing.

The Agency business is where Sotheby matches buyers and sellers and cuts a premium from both at the end of the transaction. Sotheby’s sales in this segment was $825M out of the total $938M it reported for the company in 2014. It is a very high GP margin business with 88%  and uses about $2.3B of assets out of which $900M+ are receivables from customers from the busy Q4 season. The main cost drivers for this segment are  marketing & promotions to ensure that the right dealers and collectors are present during the collection. This has been the cash cow for the company and Sotheby’s has been seeing some serious competition from Christie’s on this. The  buyer’s commission and seller’s premium that Sotheby earns in a transaction is about 14.9% on average hammer price.

Sotheby’s main rival is Christie’s and both compete furiously. It is one of the oldest duopoly in the world and is predominantly a reputation business. Sotheby’s share of the auctions done between them and Christie’s is 47%. Both have taken on different strategies off late with Sotheby catering to the ultra luxury segment and bigger ticket items and Christie’s moving lower to give a more complete collection. While other competitors like Phillips exist, the faster growing rivals are in China and HK where both the companies have expanded their horizons through acquisitions. Both operate a classic business model where reputation matters, and in which a seller is attracted to a network that will connect them to the most prospective buyers and buyers are attracted to a network where the highest potential exists for a particular interesting and authentic piece of art.

Principal: In this segment, Sotheby’s puts up capital to buy art pieces opportunistically. However, the numbers tell a very different story. The company sold about $69M of art works under this segment and made about $1.9M in the process with a gross margins of 2.7%. The period for which this capital was locked is not very clear. It is only 8% of the business and sucks about $0.1B capital and is a low return business. Given the information that Sotheby’s holds in this entire process, it is very surprising to see the low return in this business. One must also wonder why they are doing this.

Finance: Here, Sotheby finances art with a LTV of < 50%. This is an very interesting segment, as cost of capital from a credit revolver is around 2% and they are lending at close to 10% per annum. GE capital has provided this revolver for Sotheby. Sotheby has loaned about $644M with $445M in debt at 2% and rest being equity. Their NPA’s have been negligible and past dues barely any. It is one of the bright spots of the company and about 4% of the revenues are drawn from here.

At a consolidated level, Sotheby carries a debt of $2.3B of debt with $1.0B due to sellers after getting payment from buyers; $230M of mortgage for a NY properly that is adequately secured and $450M of loan from the credit revolver facilities making up the major chunk of the debt. On the asset side, this is compensated by close to $700M of cash, $900M of accounts receivable (they don’t have an obligation except where they have provided guarantees unless the buyer pays) and $698M of receivables from the financing segment.

Sotheby trades at $2.3B of market cap ($32 per share) at the time of writing. Net Income for the 2014 was $117M and $143M when you adjust for the third point activism charges that they incurred in 2014 or $2 adjusted EPS. It looks a decent franchise which will continue to play a leading role in the art world.

There are two big catches to this story:

a. Given the free monetary policies around the world, asset prices are inflated and art pieces are no exception. During the previous recessions, these companies have had really tough times moving stuff through their auction houses. Given the current state of the economy, investing in this would be a straight forward bet on the economy that it would do well.

b. The free cash flow of Sotheby has been anemic. In the last three years, it has generated about $162M of free cash flow with an average of $54M per year as compared to GAAP earnings which is closer to the $120M mark. The main culprit here in the working capital of the business, with receivables and inventory ballooning up faster than sales. It use last three years average FCF; the stock is trading north of 40 times the average FCF generated by the business.

While we do not typically short stocks, we thought it is an interesting idea to hold in the back pocket if it indeed gets any cheaper from a FCF or an owner’s earnings perspective. I must however comment that I am inclined to think favorably towards  Jim Chanos’s view of Sotheby  being a proxy economic indicator of the economy.

What are we reading?

  • Pershing Sqaure Quarterly Call (Valuewalk)
  • Ackman defends Pershing’s loss in Valeant (NYTimes)
  • My indirect experiences with Valeant (GuruFocus)
  • Why Whitney Tilson is loading up on BRK.A/B? (GuruFocus)
  • Jim Chanos on Wall Streek Week (YouTube)

Been reading a book called ‘Extreme Ownership — How Navy Seals Lead and Win’ — Terrific book on leadership. Found a lot of lessons practical and useful as a leader (Amazon)

Tata motors

Was caught thumb sucking  on  Tata Motors stock at around INR 285 earlier this month. It was so cheap that it was a screaming buy and I understood what was going on there and had a strong opinion on it and I had been smacking my lips for it to get to that price and then I sucked thumb instead of buying…

It is already 30% higher now in a couple of weeks and no longer has the same margin of safety…. Alas!

Cost of omission!

Ferrari and the Fiat Stub — RACE

Warning: Automobile sector definitely does not fall into our circle of competence.

  • Ferrari listed in NYSE and finished on 23rd Oct with a market cap of $10.7B
  • Absolute top class luxury brand with an earnings of ~$300M in 2014
  • Works out to an earnings yield of 3% and a PE of almost 35
  • We feel that Mr. Market is valuing the brand of Ferrari very highly. In our opinion, this is counted twice as the earnings already has the pricing power of the brand factored into it
  • Even if the company increased the production from 6K pcs to 9K pcs, the earnings yield will still be hovering around the 5% mark.
  • It is a low return on capital and low asset turnover business
  • Two positives abound the stock; supply is constrained and revenue and earnings stability will last longer than a normal automobile company
  • It looks as though Mr. Market is pricing RACE much ahead of its earnings potential

On the other hand, Fiat is trading with a market cap of $19.9B and if Mr. Market is pricing Ferrari at $10.7B and is right about it and Fiat owns 80% of Ferrari, then the rest of Fiat must be ~$11B. The last ten years average profit margins of Fiat is 1.7% which would result in a normalized earnings of $1.7B (excluding $300M of Ferrari earnings) valuing Fiat at 6.5 times earnings or an earnings yield of 15%. If one wants the Fiat stub ex-Ferrari, one can go long Fiat and short Ferrari to get exposure to only the Fiat piece of the stock.

We will be watching and learning in this case and not investing / speculating as this does not fall into our circle of competence but to our limited knowledge RACE looks overvalued and since we are not familiar with the cycles of the auto industry, we have no real comment on the cheapness of the Fiat stub.

Note: We are not comfortable with the interest coverage of FIAT for the debt it holds at the consolidated level. It makes us feel that the low margins are levered returns and the underlying returns could be far worse.

what are we reading?

What are we reading?

  • Valeant — A detailed look into a dangerous story well told — Part I, II, III (az)
  • Valeant — A detailed look into a dangerous story well told — Part IV (az)
  • Valeant Pharma — some comments (BronteCapital)
  • Project Owl Documents — Ferrari (SEC)
  • Fait Chrysler profits look good but Bernstein Research worries about debt (Forbes)
  • Marchionne talks of industry mergers called signs of Panic (Bloomberg)
  • Fiat Chrysler CEO spar over consolidation on call (WSJ)

Performance and Management

I have been reading through some annual reports of a company over this weekend. Seen below is the performance of the company (blue line) compared to S&P 500 (yellow line) and DOW (orange / red line). The company has massively under performed the index and even more compared to their stronger peers.

Indus

  • The market cap of the company was 22% higher 5 years ago than now
  • The company has retained ~4B of earnings to lose  close to $10B of market cap over the time period (think about the WEB retained earnings test)
  • The company has repurchased close to 50M shares at an average close to 50% above the current price today costing the shareholders another billion $
  • The company has taken write down or pretty much thrown in the towel on some of the bigger acquisitions over the last decade

Amazingly…. the same management continues to run the show and the market is watching them do another re-org of the company. Just Wow!!!! Are shareholders asleep at the wheel?